Nessus Network Monitor 6.2.2 (NNM) is a software product that is designed to passively collect traffic data from environmental networks for analysis.
\r\nNNM also connects to an environmental instance of Tenable.sc (SecurityCenter) which serves as a single point to aggregate and analyze data collected from various Tenable applications, including NNM.
\r\nNNM is a vulnerability management product that is designed to provide visibility into network assets. The product is used to collect information about its environment that is used to diagnose and enhance the security posture of the environment. It does this by passively scanning network traffic using deep packet inspection to perform asset discovery and to detect user and application activities that could indicate compromise or misuse. Information collected by NNM can be fed to the environmental Tenable.sc product for centralized aggregation, analysis, and reaction.
\r\nThe TOE’s data collection capabilities are outside the scope of the TOE, as is any other product behavior that is not described in Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4 or Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1. The content and execution of plugins is similarly excluded from the TOE, although they are discussed in the context of network communications because the TSF must use platform network resources to acquire them.
\r\nThe TOE is capable of running on a general-purpose Windows or Linux operating system on standard consumer-grade hardware on either a physical or virtual machine. For the evaluated configuration, the TOE was tested on virtualized instances of Windows Server 2019 and RHEL 8.7, each running on VMware ESXi 6.5 on a system using an AMD Ryzen Threadripper 1950X processor with the Zen microarchitecture.
","evaluation_configuration":"","security_evaluation_summary":"The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme for the Protection Profile for Application Software, Version 1.4 and the Functional Package for Transport Layer Security (TLS), Version 1.1.
\r\nThe evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 release 5. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the guidance documentation, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Nessus Network Monitor 6.2.2 Security Target. The evaluation was completed in July 2023. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"Timely Security Updates
\r\nThe TOE developer has internal mechanisms for receiving reports of security flaws, tracking product vulnerabilities, and distributing software updates to customers in a timely manner.
\r\nCryptographic Support
\r\nThe TOE implements cryptography to protect data at rest and in transit.
\r\nFor data at rest, the TOE stores credential data to log in to the TOE as well as passphrase data used to protect PKI certificates that the TOE uses to authenticate to environmental components. This stored data is encrypted using AES or a PBKDF, depending on the data that is being stored.
\r\nFor data in transit, the TOE implements TLS/HTTPS as a server. The TOE implements a TLS server for its administrative interface and to communicate with other Tenable products in its operational environment. The TOE supports mutual authentication as a TLS server for all uses.
\r\nThe TOE implements all cryptography used for these functions using its own implementations of OpenSSL with NIST-approved algorithms. The TOE’s DRBG is seeded using entropy from the underlying OS platform.
\r\nUser Data Protection
\r\nThe TOE uses cryptographic mechanisms to protect sensitive data at rest. The key used by the TOE to encrypt and decrypt sensitive data is cryptographically protected by the TOE platform.
\r\nThe TOE relies on the network connectivity and system log capabilities of its host OS platform. The TOE supports user-initiated, externally-initiated, and application-initiated uses of the network.
\r\nIdentification and Authentication
\r\nThe TOE supports X.509 certificate validation as part of establishing TLS and HTTPS connections. The TOE supports various certificate validity checking methods and can also check certificate revocation status using OCSP. If the validity status of a certificate cannot be determined, the certificate will be accepted. All other cases where a certificate is found to be invalid will result in rejection without an administrative override.
\r\nSecurity Management
\r\nThe TOE itself and the configuration settings it uses are stored in locations recommended by the platform vendor for both Windows and Linux application versions.
\r\nThe TOE includes a web GUI. This interface enforces username/password authentication using locally-stored credentials that are created using the TOE. The TOE does not include a default user account to access its management interface.
\r\nThe security-relevant management functions supported by the TOE relate to configuration of transmission of system data (through collection of network traffic).
\r\nPrivacy
\r\nThe TOE does not handle personally identifiable information (PII) of any individuals.
\r\nProtection of the TSF
\r\nThe TOE enforces various mechanisms to prevent itself from being used as an attack vector to its host OS platform. Each TOE platform version (Windows and Linux) implements address space layout randomization (ASLR), does not allocate any memory with both write and execute permissions, does not write user-modifiable files to directories that contain executable files, is compiled using stack overflow protection, and is compatible with the security features of its host OS platform.
\r\nEach TOE platform version contains libraries and invokes system APIs that are well-known and explicitly identified.
\r\nThe TOE has a mechanism to determine its current software version. Software updates to the TOE can be acquired by leveraging its OS platform. The format of the software update is dependent on the TOE platform version. All updates are digitally signed to guarantee their authenticity and integrity.
\r\nTrusted Path/Channels
\r\nThe TOE encrypts sensitive data in transit between itself and its operational environment using TLS and HTTPS. It facilitates the transmission of sensitive data from remote users over TLS and HTTPS.
","features":[{"id":3276,"feature_name":"Application Software"},{"id":3283,"feature_name":"Asymmetric Key Generation"},{"id":3344,"feature_name":"Auditing"},{"id":3293,"feature_name":"Certificate Authentication"},{"id":3292,"feature_name":"Certificate Validation"},{"id":3277,"feature_name":"Credential Storage"},{"id":3275,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Key Establishment"},{"id":3287,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Signature Generation"},{"id":3288,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Signature Verification"},{"id":3291,"feature_name":"DRBG"},{"id":3281,"feature_name":"DTLS Client"},{"id":3282,"feature_name":"DTLS Server with Mutual Authentication"},{"id":3343,"feature_name":"Flaw Remediation"},{"id":3289,"feature_name":"HTTPS Client"},{"id":3290,"feature_name":"HTTPS Server with Mutual Authentication"},{"id":3286,"feature_name":"Keyed-hash message authentication"},{"id":3284,"feature_name":"PBKDF"},{"id":3285,"feature_name":"Symmetric Key Generation"},{"id":3278,"feature_name":"TLS Client"},{"id":3279,"feature_name":"TLS Client with Mutual Authentication"},{"id":3274,"feature_name":"TLS Server with Mutual Authentication"},{"id":3280,"feature_name":"TLS Server without Mutual Authentication"}]}