The TOE is a family of switches designed to support scalability, security and high performance for campus networks.
\r\nFor the purpose of evaluation, the TOE will be treated as a network device offering CAVP tested cryptographic functions, security auditing, secure administration, trusted updates, self-tests, and secure connections to other servers (e.g., to transmit audit records). The scope of the evaluation is limited to the NDcPP22e requirements. Functions outside the scope of the NDcPP22e were not evaluated such as MACsec.
","evaluation_configuration":"The underlying architecture of each TOE appliance consists of hardware that supports physical network connections, memory, processor, and software that implements switching functions, configuration information and drivers. While hardware varies between different appliance models, the software code is shared across all platforms. The software code enforces all of the security functions claimed the security target.
\r\nThe evaluated configuration includes the following devices:
\r\n| \r\n Model \r\n | \r\n\r\n Processor ID \r\n | \r\n\r\n Microarchitecture \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 4100i \r\n | \r\n\r\n ARM Cortex-A9 \r\n | \r\n\r\n ARM Cortex-A9 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 6200F \r\n | \r\n\r\n NXP 1046A \r\n | \r\n\r\n ARM Cortex-A72 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 6300M \r\n | \r\n\r\n NXP 1046A \r\n | \r\n\r\n ARM Cortex-A72 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 6300F \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n Aruba 6405 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n Aruba 6410 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n Aruba 8360 \r\n | \r\n\r\n NXP 1046A \r\n | \r\n\r\n ARM Cortex-A72 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 8320 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Intel Atom C2538 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Rangeley \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 8325 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Intel Xeon D-1518 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Broadwell \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 8400 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Intel Xeon D-1527 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Broadwell \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 9300 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Intel Xeon D-1537 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Broadwell \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Aruba 10000 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Intel Xeon D-1637 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Hewitt Lake \r\n | \r\n
The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The criteria against which the TOE was evaluated are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Aruba Common Criteria Administrator Guidance, Target of Evaluation: Aruba 4100, 6000, 8000, 9000, and 10000 Switch Series, Version 2.4, November 28, 2023 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company 4100i, 6200, 6300, 6400, 8320, 8325, 8360, 8400, 9300, and 10000 Switch Series Version 10.11 Security Target, Version 0.7, December 4, 2023. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in December 2023. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID11391-2023) prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"The logical boundaries of the Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise Company 4100i, 6200, 6300, 6400, 8320, 8325, 8360, 8400, 9300, and 10000 Switch Series Version 10.11 are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
\r\n\r\n
Security audit:
\r\nThe TOE is able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events. The TOE can be configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator and also to send the logs to a designated log server using TLS to protect the logs while in transit on the network.
\r\nCryptographic support:
\r\nThe TOE provides CAVP certified cryptography in support of its SSHv2 and TLS v1.2 protocol implementations. Cryptographic services include key management, random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing.
\r\nIdentification and authentication:
\r\nThe TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions mediated by the TOE, with the exception of passing network traffic in accordance with its configured switching rules and reading the login banner. It provides the ability to both assign attributes (user names, passwords and roles) and to authenticate users against these attributes.
\r\nSecurity management:
\r\nThe TOE provides Command Line Interface (CLI) commands over SSH and an HTTP over TLS (HTTPS) Graphical User Interface (GUI) to access the wide range of security management functions to manage its security policies. The TOE also offers HTTP over TLS protection for RESTAPI interfaces that can be used for administration. All administrative activity and functions including security management commands are limited to authorized users (i.e., administrators) only after they have provided acceptable user identification and authentication data to the TOE. The security management functions are controlled through the use of roles that can be assigned to TOE users. The TOE supports the following roles: Administrators, Operators. The Administrator role can make changes to the TOE configuration while the Operator role is a read-only role.
\r\nProtection of the TSF:
\r\nThe TOE implements a number of measures to protect the integrity of its security features. The TOE protects stored passwords and cryptographic keys, so they are not directly accessible in plaintext. The TOE also ensures that reliable time information is available for both log accountability and synchronization with the operating environment by providing a hardware clock. The TOE employs both dedicated communication channels as well as cryptographic means to protect communication between itself and other components in the operating environment. The TOE performs self-tests to detect failure and protect itself from malicious updates.
\r\nTOE access:
\r\nThe TOE can be configured to display a logon banner before and after (a post-login banner) a user session is established. The TOE also enforces inactivity timeouts for local and remote sessions.
\r\nTrusted path/channels:
\r\nThe TOE protects communication channels between itself and remote administrators using HTTPS/TLS and SSH. The SSH protocol is used to protect administrative connections utilizing the TOE’s command line interface (CLI). Additionally, web-based GUI and RESTAPI programmatic interfaces are available for remote administration which are protected using HTTP over TLS (HTTPS/TLS).
\r\nThe TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a log server, using TLS connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of logs.
","features":[]}