The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3200, 3300, 3400, 3400H (IE3x00) Rugged Series Switches, running IOS-XE 17.12, is a purpose-built switching and routing platform with OSI Layer2 and Layer3 traffic filtering capabilities that provides connectivity and security services. These switches offer broadband speeds and simplified management to small businesses, and enterprise small branch and teleworkers. The Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged Series Switches is a single-device security and switching solutions for protecting the network.
","evaluation_configuration":"The TOE is a hardware and software solution composed of the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12.
\r\nThe evaluated configuration consists of the following devices:
\r\n| \r\n Catalyst IE3200 Hardware Models \r\n | \r\n\r\n IE-3200-8T2S, IE-3200-8P2S \r\n\r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Catalyst IE3300 Hardware Models \r\n | \r\n\r\n IE-3300-8T2S, IE-3300-8P2S, IE-3300- 8T2X, IE-3300- 8U2X \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Catalyst IE3400 Hardware Models \r\n | \r\n\r\n IE-3400-8T2S, IE-3400-8P2S \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Catalyst IE3400H Hardware Models \r\n | \r\n\r\n IE-3400H-8FT, IE-3400H-8T, IE-3400H-16FT, IE-3400H-16T, IE-3400H-24FT, IE-3400H-24T \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Software Version \r\n | \r\n\r\n IOS-XE 17.12 \r\n | \r\n
The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3200, 3300, 3400, 3400H (IE3x00) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 CC Configuration Guide, Version 0.8, 05/15/2024 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet 3200, 3300, 3400, 3400H (IE3x00) Rugged Series Switches running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Security Target, Version 0.7, 05/15/2024. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in May 2024. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"The logical boundaries of the TOE are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
\r\nSecurity audit:
\r\nThe Cisco Catalyst Industrial Ethernet IE3x00 Rugged Series Switches provide extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE generates a comprehensive set of audit logs that identify specific TOE operations. For each event, the TOE records the date and time of each event, the type of event, the subject identity, and the outcome of the event.
\r\nAuditable events include:
\r\n· failure on invoking cryptographic functionality such as establishment, termination and failure of cryptographic session establishments and connections;
\r\n· modifications to the group of users that are part of the Authorized Administrator roles;
\r\n· all use of the user identification mechanism;
\r\n· any use of the authentication mechanism;
\r\n· unsuccessful login attempts limit is met or exceeded;
\r\n· any change in the configuration of the TOE;
\r\n· changes to time;
\r\n· initiation of TOE update;
\r\n· indication of completion of TSF self-test;
\r\n· termination of a remote or local session;
\r\n· and initiation and termination of a trusted channel
\r\nThe TOE is configured to transmit its audit messages to an external syslog server. Communication with the syslog server is protected using IPsec and the TOE can determine when communication with the syslog server fails. If that should occur, the TOE will store all audit records locally and when the connection to the remote syslog server is restored, all stored audit records will be transmitted to the remote syslog server
\r\nThe audit logs can be viewed on the TOE using the appropriate IOS-XE commands. The records include the date/time the event occurred, the event/type of event, the user associated with the event, and additional information of the event and its success and/or failure. The TOE does not have an interface to modify audit records, though there is an interface available for the Authorized Administrator to clear audit data stored locally on the TOE.
\r\nCryptographic support:
\r\nThe TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. All the algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates (Operation Environment – Xilinx ZU3EG (ARM Cortex-A53).
\r\nThe TOE leverages the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) Rel5a as identified in the table below. The IOS software calls the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) Rel5a (Firmware Version: Rel 5a) that has been validated for conformance to the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 1.
\r\nThe TOE provides cryptography in support of secure connections that includes remote administrative management via SSHv2, and IPsec to secure the transmission of audit records to the remote syslog server.
\r\nIdentification and authentication:
\r\nThe TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device (TOE peers) and user authentication for the Authorized Administrator of the TOE. Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer. The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec mutual authentication. The IKE phase authentication for the IPsec communication channel between the TOE and syslog server is considered part of the Identification and Authentication security functionality of the TOE.
\r\nThe TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOE’s secure CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of between 1-127 characters. The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be performed on the local serial console or SSHv2 interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys.
\r\nThe TOE also provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters invalid information. When the threshold for a defined number of failed authentication attempts has exceeded the configured allowable attempts, the user is locked out for an administrator specified time period.
\r\nThe TOE uses X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for IPsec connections.
\r\nSecurity management:
\r\nThe TOE provides secure remote administrative interface and local interface to perform security management functions. This includes ability to configure cryptographic functionality; an access banner containing an advisory notice and consent warning message; a session inactivity timer before session termination as well as an ability to update TOE software. The TOE provides a Security Administrator role and only the Security Administrator can perform the above security management functions.
\r\nProtection of the TSF:
\r\nThe TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to Authorized Administrators. The TOE prevents the reading of cryptographic keys and passwords. Additionally, Cisco IOS-XE is not a general-purpose operating system, access to Cisco IOS-XE memory space is restricted to Cisco IOS-XE functions.
\r\nThe TOE can verify software updates prior to the software updates being installed on the TOE. This verification avoids the installation of unauthorized software.
\r\nThe TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time are used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. The TOE provides the Authorized Administrators the capability to update the TOE’s clock manually to maintain a reliable timestamp.
\r\nFinally, the TOE performs self-testing to verify correct operation of the TOE itself and that of the cryptographic module.
\r\nTOE access:
\r\nThe TOE can terminate inactive local and remote sessions after an Authorized Administrator configurable time period. Once a session has been terminated, the TOE requires the Authorized Administrator to re-authenticate to establish a new session. Sessions can also be terminated if an Authorized Administrator enters “exit” or the “logout” command.
\r\nThe TOE can also display an Authorized Administrator specified banner on the CLI management interface prior to allowing any administrative access to the TOE.
\r\nTrusted path/channels:
\r\nThe TOE allows a trusted path to be established to itself from remote administrators over SSHv2 and initiates outbound IPsec trusted channels to transmit audit messages to remote syslog servers.
","features":[{"id":3171,"feature_name":"Asymmetric Key Generation"},{"id":3168,"feature_name":"Auditing"},{"id":3179,"feature_name":"Certificate Authentication"},{"id":3176,"feature_name":"Certificate Validation"},{"id":3174,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Hashing"},{"id":3172,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Key Establishment"},{"id":3173,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Signature Verification"},{"id":3170,"feature_name":"DRBG"},{"id":3181,"feature_name":"IKEv2"},{"id":3178,"feature_name":"IPsec"},{"id":3169,"feature_name":"Key Destruction"},{"id":3175,"feature_name":"Keyed-hash message authentication"},{"id":3177,"feature_name":"SSH Server"}]}