The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Zebra Devices on Android 13.
\r\nThe Zebra Devices are handheld computing devices utilizing the Qualcomm-based chipsets, angled rear-facing barcode reader, optional stylus pen, and battery that is warm-swappable. The Devices use the Android operating system, providing access to applications from the Google Play store or Zebra's partners. The Devices feature built-in multi-carrier 4G LTE and FirstNet Ready with Band 14, voice capabilities, and dual SIM cards. The TOE supports using client certificates to connect to access points offering WPA2/WPA3 networks with 802.1x/EAP-TLS, or alternatively connecting to cellular base stations when utilizing mobile data.
\r\nThe TOE offers mobile applications an Application Programming Interface (API) including that provided by the Android framework and supports API calls to the Android Management APIs.
","evaluation_configuration":"The TOE encompasses mobile devices that support enterprises and individual users alike and this evaluation tested the following models and versions.
\r\n| \r\n Product \r\n | \r\n\r\n Model # \r\n | \r\n\r\n CPU \r\n | \r\n\r\n Arch \r\n | \r\n\r\n Kernel \r\n | \r\n\r\n Android OS version \r\n | \r\n\r\n Security Patch Level \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n 660 Mobile Handhelds \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC57 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Qualcomm SDM660 \r\n | \r\n\r\n ARMv8 \r\n | \r\n\r\n 4.19 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Android 13.0 \r\n | \r\n\r\n February 2024 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n 6490 Mobile Handhelds \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC58 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Qualcomm QCM6490 \r\n | \r\n\r\n ARMv8 \r\n | \r\n\r\n 5.4 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Android 13.0 \r\n | \r\n\r\n February 2024 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n 6375 Mobile Handhelds \r\n | \r\n\r\n ET45 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Qualcomm SM6375 \r\n | \r\n\r\n ARMv8 \r\n | \r\n\r\n 5.4 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Android 13.0 \r\n | \r\n\r\n February 2024 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n 5430 Mobile Handheld \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC27 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Qualcomm QCM5430 \r\n | \r\n\r\n ARMv8 \r\n | \r\n\r\n 5.4 \r\n | \r\n\r\n Android 13.0 \r\n | \r\n\r\n February 2024 \r\n | \r\n
\r\n
The following other, equivalent models are included in the evaluation as they utilize the same hardware components and same image as the above devices (i.e., each CPU model has one image):
\r\n| \r\n CPU \r\n | \r\n\r\n Wireless Chipset \r\n | \r\n\r\n Model # \r\n | \r\n\r\n Cellular \r\n | \r\n\r\n Description \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n SDM660 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WCN3990 \r\n | \r\n\r\n CC600 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 5” Landscape Tablet-style kiosk device, No Camera \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n CC6000 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 10” CC600 with optional camera, optional orientation \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n ET51 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 8” / 10” Tablet \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n ET56 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WWAN Data Only \r\n | \r\n\r\n ET51 with WWAN Data Only \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n L10A \r\n | \r\n\r\n WWAN Data Only \r\n | \r\n\r\n 10” Ultra Rugged Tablet \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n MC20 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 4” Keypad device, Japan Only \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n MC9300 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 4.3” Ultra Rugged Keypad device \r\n(SE965, SE4750, SE4770, SE4750 DPM, OR SE4850) \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n PS20 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 4” Personal Shopper, (SE2100 Scanner) or (SE4710 Scanner with Front Facing Camera) \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC52 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 5” Phone with EMMC Flash, SE4710 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC52-HC \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC52 made from healthcare grade plastics \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC52x \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC52 with UFS Flash and SE4720 instead of SE4710 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC52x-HC \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC52x made from healthcare grade plastics \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC57 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC52 with WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC57x \r\n | \r\n\r\n WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC52x with WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC72 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n\r\n | \r\n\r\n 4.7” Ultra Rugged phone with (either SE4750, SE4750 + 1 SAM, or SE4770), NFC - Single SAM support for Calypso, Felica and Mifare technology. \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC77 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC72 with WWAN / Cellular \r\n1 SAM option is replaced with 2 SAM option, NFC - Dual SAM support for Calypso, Felica and Mifare technology. \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC83 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 4” Ultra Rugged Touch Computer/Gun Handler with either SE4750, SE4750 DPM, SE4770, or SE4850 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n VC83 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 8” / 10” Vehicle Mounted Computer with AZERTTY or QWERTY keyboard, Capacitive vs Heated Capacitive touchscreen, Outdoor readable vs standard display \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n WT6300 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 3.2” Glove-optimized Rugged Wearable \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n WCN3980 \r\n\r\n | \r\n\r\n TC21 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 5” Phone with both FFC&RFC Camera or RFC Camera, with either SE4100, SE4710, or Camera Data Scanning \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n TC21-HC \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC21 made from healthcare grade plastics \r\nLimited to Both FFC&RFC Camera with SE4100 options \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC26 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC21 with WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC26-HC \r\n | \r\n\r\n WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC21-HC with WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n BCM43752 \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC52ax \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC52 with BCM43752, UFS Flash, SE55 Advanced Range \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n SM6375 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WCN3988 \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC15 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n\r\n 6.5” Phone with 5G, SE4710 or SE4100 or SE4710 + Dual WWAN. NFC – PN557 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n TN28 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n\r\n 6.5” Phone with 5G, SE4710 or SE4770, NFC – PN557 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n BCM43752 \r\n | \r\n\r\n ET40 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 8” / 10” Tablet, SE4100, NFC PN7160 \r\n | \r\n|
| \r\n ET40HC \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 10” ET40 made from healthcare grade plastics \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n ET45 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WWAN Data Only \r\n | \r\n\r\n ET40 with 5G and additional combos of size/RAM/storage \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n ET45HC \r\n | \r\n\r\n WWAN Data Only \r\n | \r\n\r\n 10” ET45 made from healthcare grade plastics \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n QCM5430 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WCN6856 \r\n\r\n | \r\n\r\n HC20 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 6” phone with front + rear camera, optional SE4720 \r\nMade from healthcare grade plastics \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n HC50 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 6” Premium phone with SE4720, front + rear camera \r\nMade from healthcare grade plastics \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC22 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 6” Phone with front + rear camera, SE4710 or SE55 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC27 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC22 with WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n QCM6490 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WCN6856 \r\n\r\n | \r\n\r\n ET60 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 10” Tablet - SKU1: Standard screen/battery, SKU2: Additional Touch Screen Heater, no battery, SKU3: SKU1 + SE55 Scanner \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n ET65 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WWAN Data Only \r\n | \r\n\r\n ET60 with 1 physical SIM and 1 eSIM, extended battery or standard battery or standard battery + SE55 \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC53 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 6” phone with front + rear camera, either SE4770 or (SE5500 and OIS in rear camera) \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC58 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC53 with WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC73 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WLAN \r\n | \r\n\r\n 6” phone with front + rear camera, with either SE4770 or (SE5500 and OIS in rear camera) \r\n | \r\n||
| \r\n TC78 \r\n | \r\n\r\n WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n\r\n TC73 with WWAN / Cellular \r\n | \r\n
\r\n
The above models may represent additional model-specific SKUs which vary by screen-size, RAM / Storage Capacity, battery capacity, base vs premium materials.
","security_evaluation_summary":"The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The product satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Zebra Devices on Android 13 Security Target, Version 0.4, July 26, 2024 when delivered and configured as identified using the appropriate Administrator Guidance document from the following:
\r\nThe project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in August 2024. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID11486-2024) prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"The logical boundaries of the Devices on Android 13 are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
\r\n\r\n
Security audit:
\r\nThe TOE implements a security log and logcat that are each stored in a circular memory buffer. An MDM agent can read/fetch the security logs, can retrieve logcat logs, and then handle appropriately (potentially storing the log to Flash or transmitting its contents to the MDM server). These log methods meet the logging requirements outlined by FAU_GEN.1 in MDFPP33.
\r\nCryptographic support:
\r\nThe TOE includes multiple cryptographic libraries with CAVP certified algorithms for a wide range of cryptographic functions including the following: asymmetric key generation and establishment, symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing and keyed-hash message authentication. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key and protected data destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions may be used to implement security protocols such as TLS, EAP-TLS, IPsec, and HTTPS and to encrypt the media (including the generation and protection of data and key encryption keys) used by the TOE. Many of these cryptographic functions are also accessible as services to applications running on the TOE allowing application developers to ensure their application meets the required criteria to remain compliant to MDFPP33 standards.
\r\nUser data protection:
\r\nThe TOE controls access to system services by hosted applications, including protection of the Trust Anchor Database. Additionally, the TOE protects user and other sensitive data using File-Based Encryption (FBE) so that even if a device is physically lost, the data remains protected. The TOE’s evaluated configuration supports Android Enterprise profiles to provide additional separation between application and application data belonging to the Enterprise profile. Please see the Admin Guide for additional details regarding how to set up and use Enterprise profiles.
\r\nIdentification and authentication:
\r\nThe TOE supports a number of features related to identification and authentication. From a user perspective, except for FCC mandated (making phone calls to an emergency number) or non-sensitive functions (e.g., choosing the keyboard input method or taking screen shots), a password (i.e., Password Authentication Factor) must be correctly entered to unlock the TOE. Also, even when unlocked, the TOE requires the user re-enter the password to change the password. Passwords are obscured when entered so they cannot be read from the TOE's display and the frequency of entering passwords is limited and when a configured number of failures occurs, the TOE will be wiped to protect its contents. Passwords can be constructed using upper and lower cases characters, numbers, and special characters and passwords up to 16 characters are supported.
\r\nThe TOE can also serve as an 802.1X supplicant and can both use X.509v3 and validate certificates for EAP-TLS, TLS, and HTTPS exchanges.
\r\nSecurity management:
\r\nThe TOE provides all the interfaces necessary to manage the security functions identified throughout this Security Target as well as other functions commonly found in mobile devices. Many of the available functions are available to users of the TOE while many are restricted to administrators operating through a Mobile Device Management solution once the TOE has been enrolled.
\r\nProtection of the TSF:
\r\nThe TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects particularly sensitive data such as cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible or exportable through the use of the application processor’s hardware. The TOE disallows all read access to the Root Encryption Key and retains all keys derived from the REK within its Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Application software can only use keys derived from the REK by reference and receive the result.
\r\nThe TOE also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g., for log accountability). It enforces read, write, and execute memory page protections, uses address space layout randomization, and stack-based buffer overflow protections to minimize the potential to exploit application flaws. It also protects itself from modification by applications as well as to isolate the address spaces of applications from one another to protect those applications.
\r\nThe TOE includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an operational mode. It also includes mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE. Digital signature checking also extends to verifying applications prior to their installation as all applications must have signatures (even if self-signed).
\r\nTOE access:
\r\nThe TOE can be locked, obscuring its display, by the user or after a configured interval of inactivity. The TOE also has the capability to display an administrator specified (using the TOE’s MDM API) advisory message (banner) when the user unlocks the TOE for the first use after reboot.
\r\nThe TOE is also able to attempt to connect to wireless networks as configured.
\r\nTrusted path/channels:
\r\nThe TOE supports the use of IEEE 802.11-2012, 802.1X, and EAP-TLS and TLS, HTTPS to secure communications channels between itself and other trusted network devices
","features":[{"id":3380,"feature_name":"Asymmetric Key Generation"},{"id":3369,"feature_name":"Auditing"},{"id":3386,"feature_name":"Bluetooth"},{"id":3379,"feature_name":"Certificate Authentication"},{"id":3378,"feature_name":"Certificate Validation"},{"id":3382,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Hashing"},{"id":3381,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Key Establishment"},{"id":3384,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Signature Generation"},{"id":3385,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Signature Verification"},{"id":3374,"feature_name":"DRBG"},{"id":3375,"feature_name":"EAP-TLS"},{"id":3376,"feature_name":"HTTPS Client"},{"id":3370,"feature_name":"Key Destruction"},{"id":3383,"feature_name":"Keyed-hash message authentication"},{"id":3373,"feature_name":"Mobile Device"},{"id":3377,"feature_name":"Multifactor Authentication"},{"id":3371,"feature_name":"TLS 1.2"},{"id":3372,"feature_name":"TLS Client"},{"id":3388,"feature_name":"Wi-Fi 6"},{"id":3387,"feature_name":"WLAN Client"},{"id":3390,"feature_name":"WPA2"},{"id":3389,"feature_name":"WPA3"}]}