The HSR10 CSfC Software Encryption Layer (hereafter referred to as the TOE) is a rugged Network Attached Storage (NAS) file server for use in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), and Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. The TOE operates at the firmware level. Easily integrated into network centric systems, the HSR10 is an easy to use, turnkey, rugged network File Server that houses one Removable Memory Module (RMM) that provides quick off load of data. The RMM can be easily removed from one HSR10 and installed into any other HSR10 providing full, seamless data transfer between one or more networks in separate locations (e.g. ground => vehicle => ground). In addition to the software/firmware-based FDE layer provided by the HSR10, the HSR10 provides a hardware-based Full Drive Encryption (FDE) layer to encrypt the drive within the RMM. The hardware-based FDE layer is addressed in a separate evaluation.
\r\nTo comply with NIAP Technical Decision 606 the TOE must be managed using the serial cable or by using SSH over a private, dedicated network.
","evaluation_configuration":"The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions HSR10 CSfC Software Encryption Layer v1.1.0
","security_evaluation_summary":"The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Curtiss-Wright HSR10 CSfC 10GbE High Speed Recorder – Commercial Solutions for Classified User Guide, DDOC0183-000-NIAP document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions HSR10 CSfC Software Encryption Layer v1.1.0 Security Target, Version 0.5, October 31, 2024. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in October 2024. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID11506-2024) prepared by CCEVS
","environmental_strengths":"The logical boundaries of the Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions HSR10 CSfC Software Encryption Layer v1.1.0 are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
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Cryptographic support:
\r\nThe TOE includes cryptographic functionality for key management, user authentication, and block-based encryption including: symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message authentication, and password-based key derivation. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to encrypt Data-At-Rest (including the generation and protection of keys and key encryption keys) used by the TOE.
\r\nUser data protection:
\r\nThe TOE performs Full Drive Encryption on the drive (so that no plaintext exists) and does so without user intervention.
\r\nSecurity management:
\r\nThe TOE provides each of required management services to manage the full drive encryption using a command line interface.
\r\nProtection of the TSF:
\r\nThe TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects key and key material, and includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an operational mode
","features":[{"id":2717,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Hashing"},{"id":2716,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Signature Verification"},{"id":2713,"feature_name":"DRBG"},{"id":2711,"feature_name":"Full Drive Encryption"},{"id":2712,"feature_name":"Key Destruction"},{"id":2719,"feature_name":"Keyed-hash message authentication"},{"id":2715,"feature_name":"Symmetric Key Generation"}]}