The TOE is comprised of both software and hardware. The hardware is comprised of an industry standard small form factor cards which provide a compact, module, and customizable solution.
\r\nThe ESS9300 and ESS3300 models provide secure Layer 2 switching using Enterprise-grade Cisco IOS-XE switching security features to ensure highly secure data communication. The products feature a robust industrial design and support Power over Ethernet.
\r\nCisco IOS-XE is a Cisco-developed highly configurable proprietary operating system that provides for efficient and effective routing and switching. Although IOS-XE performs many networking functions, this TOE only addresses the functions that provide for the security of the TOE itself.
","evaluation_configuration":"The hardware models included in the evaluation are: ESS-3300-NCP, ESS-3300-CON, ESS-3300-24T-NCP, ESS-3300-24T-CON and ESS-9300-10X-E. The software is comprised of the Cisco IOS-XE 17.12.
","security_evaluation_summary":"The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Cisco Embedded Services 3300 and 9300 Series Switches (ESS3300 & ESS9300) running IOS-XE 17.12 Common Criteria Configuration Guide, version 1.0, March 10, 2025 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Cisco Embedded Services 9300 and 3300 Series Switches (ESS9300 & ESS3300) running IOS-XE 17.12 Security Target, version 1.0, March 10, 2025. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in March 2025. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID11521-2025) prepared by CCEVS.
\r\n","environmental_strengths":"
The logical boundaries of the Cisco Embedded Services 9300 and 3300 Series Switches (ESS9300 & ESS3300) running IOS-XE 17.12 are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
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Security audit:
\r\nAuditing allows Security Administrators to discover intentional and unintentional issues with the TOE’s configuration and/or operation. Auditing of administrative activities provides information that may be used to hasten corrective action should the system be configured incorrectly. Security audit data can also provide an indication of failure of critical portions of the TOE (e.g. a communication channel failure or anomalous activity (e.g. establishment of an administrative session at a suspicious time, repeated failures to establish sessions or authenticate to the TOE) of a suspicious nature.
\r\nThe TOE provides extensive capabilities to generate audit data targeted at detecting such activity. The TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event. Each security relevant audit event has the date, timestamp, event description, and subject identity. The TOE stores audit messages in a circular audit trail configurable by the Security Administrator. All audit logs are transmitted to an external audit server over a trusted channel protected with IPsec.
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Cryptographic support:
\r\nThe TOE provides cryptographic functions to implement SSH, IPsec, and MACsec protocols. The cryptographic algorithm implementation has been validated for CAVP conformance. This includes key generation and random bit generation, key establishment methods, key destruction, and the various types of cryptographic operations to provide AES encryption/decryption, signature verification, hash generation, and keyed hash generation. A high-level summary of the crypto graphic services provided by the TOE and their uses are shown in Table 6. TOE Cryptography Use below.
\r\n\r\n| \r\n Cryptographic Method \r\n | \r\n\r\n Use within the TOE \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Internet Key Exchange \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used to establish initial IPsec session. \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n Secure Shell Establishment \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used to establish initial SSH session. \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n RSA Signature Services \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used in IPsec session establishment. \r\nUsed in SSH session establishment. \r\nX.509 certificate signing \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n NIST SP 800-90A DRBG \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used for random number generation, key generation and seeds to asymmetric key generation \r\nUsed in IPsec session establishment. \r\nUsed in SSH session establishment. \r\nUsed in MACsec session establishment. \r\n\r\n | \r\n
| \r\n SHS \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used to provide IPsec traffic integrity verification \r\nUsed to provide SSH traffic integrity verification \r\nUsed for keyed-hash message authentication \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n AES \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used to encrypt IPsec session traffic. \r\nUsed to encrypt SSH session traffic. \r\nUsed to encrypt MACsec traffic. \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n EC-DH \r\n | \r\n\r\n Used as the Key exchange method for SSH and IPsec \r\n | \r\n
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The TOE provides cryptographic support for remote administrative management via SSHv2 and IPsec to secure the transmission of audit records to the remote syslog server. In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the authentication servers. SSH and IPsec protocols are implemented using the IOS Common Cryptographic Module (IC2M) version Rel5a cryptographic modules.
\r\nThe TOE authenticates and encrypts packets between itself and a MACsec peer. The MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) Protocol provides the required session keys and manages the required encryption keys to protect data exchanged by the peers.
\r\nThe ESS3300 supports MACsec using the Broadcom BCM54194 a fully integrated octal Gigabit transceiver with standard compliant IEEE 802.1AE 256bit MACsec functionality (Cert # AES 4544). The tested environment is AES ECB 128bit & 256bit Encryption/Decryption Engine.
\r\nThe ESS9300 supports MACsec using the proprietary Unified Access Data Plane (UADP) MSC version 1.1 (Cert. # AES 4848). The MACsec Controller (MSC) is embedded within the ASICs that are utilized within Cisco hardware platforms. The tested environment is Synopsys VCS v2011.12mx-SP1-3.
\r\nAll the algorithms claimed have CAVP certificates. Refer to Table 7. CAVP Certificates for identification of the relevant CAVP certificates.
\r\n\r\n| \r\n SFR \r\n | \r\n\r\n Selection \r\n | \r\n\r\n Algorithm \r\n | \r\n\r\n Implementation \r\n | \r\n\r\n Certificate Number \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n FCS_CKM.1 – Cryptographic Key Generation \r\n\r\n | \r\n\r\n 2048 \r\n3072 \r\nP-256 \r\nP-384 \r\n | \r\n\r\n RSA \r\n\r\n ECDSA \r\n | \r\n\r\n IC2M Rel5a \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n FCS_CKM.2 – Cryptographic Key Establishment \r\n | \r\n\r\n P-256 \r\nP-384 \r\n | \r\n\r\n KAS-ECC \r\n | \r\n\r\n IC2M Rel5a \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption – AES Data Encryption/Decryption \r\n | \r\n\r\n AES-CBC-128 \r\nAES-CBC-256 \r\nAES-GCM-128 \r\nAES-GCM-256 \r\n\r\n | \r\n\r\n AES \r\n | \r\n\r\n IC2M Rel5a \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n FCS_COP.1/MACSEC Cryptographic Operation (MACsec AES Data Encryption and Decryption) \r\n | \r\n\r\n AES-GCM-128 \r\nAES-GCM-256 \r\n\r\n \r\n \r\n | \r\n\r\n AES \r\n | \r\n\r\n MACsec \r\n | \r\n\r\n 4544 (ESS3000) \r\n4848 (ESS9300) \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n FCS_COP.1/MACSEC Cryptographic Operation (MACsec AES Data Encryption andDecryption) \r\n | \r\n\r\n AES-KW \r\n128 bits \r\n | \r\n\r\n AES \r\n | \r\n\r\n IC2M Rel5a \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n FCS_COP.1/SigGen – Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification) \r\n | \r\n\r\n 2048 \r\n3072 \r\n\r\n | \r\n\r\n RSA \r\n | \r\n\r\n IC2M Rel5a \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n FCS_COP.1/Hash – Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm) \r\n | \r\n\r\n SHA-1 \r\nSHA-256 \r\nSHA-384 \r\nSHA-512 \r\n | \r\n\r\n SHS \r\n | \r\n\r\n IC2M Rel5a \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash – Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm) \r\n\r\n \r\n | \r\n\r\n HMAC-SHA-256 \r\n\r\n | \r\n\r\n HMAC \r\n | \r\n\r\n IC2M Rel5a \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n FCS_COP.1/CMAC Cryptographic Operation (AES-CMAC Keyed Hash Algorithm) \r\n | \r\n\r\n AES-CMAC \r\n128 bits \r\n256 bits \r\n | \r\n\r\n AES-CMAC \r\n | \r\n\r\n IC2M Rel5a \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n
| \r\n FCS_RBG_EXT.1– Random Bit Generation \r\n | \r\n\r\n CTR_DRBG (AES) \r\n256 bits \r\n | \r\n\r\n DRBG \r\n | \r\n\r\n IC2M Rel5a \r\n | \r\n\r\n A1462 \r\n | \r\n
\r\n
Identification and authentication:
\r\nThe TOE implements three types of authentications to provide a trusted means for Security Administrators and remote servers/endpoints to securely communicate: X.509v3 certificate-based authentication per RFC 5280 for IPSec connections to remote syslog or RADIUS AAA servers, password-based and public key based (SSH) authentication for Security Administrators, and pre-shared keys for MACsec endpoints.
\r\nSecurity Administrators have the ability to compose strong passwords which are stored using a SHA-2 hash. Additionally, the TOE detects and tracks successive unsuccessful remote authentication attempts and provides an automatic lockout when a user attempts to authenticate and enters invalid information. After a defined number of authentication attempts exceeding the configured allowable attempts within a configured time interval, the user or administrators account is locked out until the configured amount of time has passed.
\r\nThe TOE provides authentication services for administrative users to connect to the TOE’s secure CLI administrator interface. The TOE requires Authorized Administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. The TOE supports the use of a RADIUS AAA server (part of the IT Environment) for authentication of administrative users attempting to connect to the TOE’s CLI.
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Security management:
\r\nThe TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either through a secure SSHv2 session or via a local console connection. The TOE provides the ability to securely:
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The TOE supports two separate administrator roles: non-privileged administrator and privileged administrator. Only the privileged administrator can perform the above security relevant management functions. Management of the TSF data is restricted to Security Administrators. The ability to enable, disable, determine and modify the behavior of all of the security functions of the TOE is restricted to authorized administrators.
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Protection of the TSF:
\r\nThe TOE protects critical security data including keys and passwords against tampering by untrusted subjects. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords. The TOE provides reliable timestamps to support monitoring local and remote interactive administrative sessions for inactivity, validating X.509 certificates (to determine if a certificate has expired), and to support accurate audit records.
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The TOE provides self-tests to ensure it is operating correctly, including the ability to detect software integrity failures. Additionally, the TOE provides an ability to perform software updates and to verify those software updates are from Cisco Systems, Inc.
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Whenever a self-test failure occurs within the TOE, the TOE ceases operation (crashes). In the event of a crash appropriate information is displayed on the console screen and saved in the crashinfo file.
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Additionally, Cisco IOS-XE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to Cisco IOS-XE memory space is restricted to only Cisco IOS-XE functions.
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TOE access:
\r\nThe TOE monitors both local and remote admin sessions for inactivity and terminates when a threshold time period is reached. Once a session has been terminated the TOE requires the user to re-authenticate. Sessions can also be terminated by an Authorized Administrator.
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The TOE also displays a Security Administrator specified advisory notice and consent warning message prior to initiating identification and authentication for each administrative user.
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Trusted path/channels:
\r\nThe TOE provides encryption (protection from disclosure and detection of modification) for communication paths between itself and remote endpoints.
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The TOE allows trusted paths to be established to itself from remote administrators over SSHv2 and initiates outbound IPsec tunnels to transmit audit messages to remote syslog servers. In addition, IPsec is used to secure the session between the TOE and the authentication servers. The TOE also supports MACsec secured trusted channels between itself and MACsec peers.
\r\nIn addition, the TOE provides two-way authentication of each endpoint in a cryptographically secure manner, meaning that even if there was a malicious attacker between the two endpoints, any attempt to represent themselves to either endpoint of the communications path as the other communicating party would be detected.
","features":[{"id":398,"feature_name":"Asymmetric Key Generation"},{"id":395,"feature_name":"Auditing"},{"id":426,"feature_name":"Certificate Authentication"},{"id":409,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Hashing"},{"id":401,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Key Establishment"},{"id":406,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Signature Verification"},{"id":397,"feature_name":"DRBG"},{"id":428,"feature_name":"IKEv2"},{"id":424,"feature_name":"IPsec"},{"id":396,"feature_name":"Key Destruction"},{"id":430,"feature_name":"MACsec"},{"id":419,"feature_name":"SSH Server"}]}