{"product_id":11556,"v_id":11556,"product_name":"Klas VoyagerVM 4.0 running KlasOS Keel 5.4.3","certification_status":"Certified","certification_date":"2025-05-30T00:00:00Z","tech_type":"Network Device,Remote Access","vendor_id":{"name":"Anduril","website":"https://www.klasgroup.com"},"vendor_poc":"Toby Stidham","vendor_phone":"657-791-0983","vendor_email":"tstidham@anduril.com","assigned_lab":{"cctl_name":"Acumen Security"},"product_description":"

The TOE is Klas VoyagerVM 4.0 running KlasOS Keel 5.4.3 (herein referred to as the TOE). It runs the 5.4.3 firmware combining both connectivity and local compute capabilities. This provides users with cloud connectivity when necessary and local processing power for analytics when there is no backhaul. Administration can be performed locally or over a trusted SSH channel. All TOE models below run the same Klas Keel 5.4.3 binary file. The TOE supports SSH functionality for both management and export of logging information.

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Table 1 – TOE Model

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TOE Model

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Specifications

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VoyagerVM 4.0

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Xeon D-1746TER

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Intel(R) Xeon(R) Ice Lake D-1746TER 10-Core CPU @ 2.00GHz with 128GB RAM or

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Xeon D-1712TR

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Intel® Xeon® D-1712TR Processor 4-Core CPU @ 2.00GHz with 128GB RAM

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Network Ports:

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॰ 4 x 25 Gbps SFP28 interfaces

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॰ 2 x 2.5 Gbps RJ45 Ethernet ports

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॰ 1 x RJ45 Ethernet for management

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॰ 1 x RJ45 Serial console port

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Network Ports:  1 x console, 2 x 10 GB SFP, 2 x 1GB ethernet

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Storage:

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• 2 x E1.S 9.5mm NVMe SED SSDs

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• 1 x VIK+ NVMe boot or write-cache device

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• 1 x 256 GB NVMe internal boot device

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(optional)

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","evaluation_configuration":"

The TOE boundary is the hardware appliance which is comprised of hardware and the KlasOS Keel software component. The TOE hardware model is provided in Table 2 – TOE Model of the ST.

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The TOE also supports secure connectivity with several other IT environment devices, including the ones identified in the following table.

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The TOE implements SSHv2 to protect the remote management interface for administrators.

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TOE Physical Boundary Components

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Component

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Required

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Purpose/Description

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Management Workstation

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Yes

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A management workstation that is directly connected to the TOE’s console port may be used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration.

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Note: Either a remote or local management workstation, or both can be used.

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Remote (Management) Workstation / Remote SSH CLI

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Yes

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This includes any IT Environment Management workstation with a SSH client installed that is used by the TOE administrator to support TOE administration through SSH protected channel. Any SSH client that supports SSHv2 may be used.

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Note: Either a remote or local management workstation, or both can be used.

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Syslog Server

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Yes

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The syslog audit server is used for remote storage of audit records that have been generated by and transmitted from the TOE. An SSH tunnel is established by the TOE and logs are transmitted using this encrypted method.

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NTP Server

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No

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The NTP server is used to send reliable timestamps to the TOE using NTPv3 and SHA1 as the message digest algorithm.

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","security_evaluation_summary":"

The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The criteria against which the Klas VoyagerVM 4.0 running KlasOS Keel 5.4.3 was evaluated is described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 5.  The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 rev 5.  The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Common Criteria Administrator Guidance, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Klas VoyagerVM 4.0 running KlasOS Keel 5.4.3 Security Target. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review.  The evaluation was completed in June 2025.  Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.

","environmental_strengths":"

1.1.1.1        Security Audit

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The TOE generates audit events for all start-up and shutdown functions as well as all auditable events specified in Table 12 – Security Functional Requirements and Auditable Events. Audit events are also generated for management actions specified in FAU_GEN.1. The TOE stores audit records locally and will export them to an external syslog server using SSHv2 as a tunnel. Each audit record contains the date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and other relevant data for the event. Only a security administrator can enable logging to a syslog server.

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1.1.1.2        Cryptographic Support

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The cryptographic used in the TOE are presented in the following table.

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Table 2 –TOE Cryptography Implementation

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Cryptographic Methods

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Usage

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FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

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  • Cryptographic key generation conforming to FIPS PUB 186-4 “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3.
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  • RSA Key sizes supported are 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits.
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  • Cryptographic key generation conforming to FIPS PUB 186-4 “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4.
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  • Elliptic NIST curves supported are: P-256, P-384, and P-521.
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FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

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  • Elliptical curve-based establishment conforming to NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”
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FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

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  • Refer to Table 17 – Cryptographic Key Destruction for Key Zeroization in the ST for details.
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FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operations (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)

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  • AES encryption and decryption conforming to CBC and CTR as specified in ISO 10116.
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  • AES key size supported is 128 and 256 bits
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  • AES mode supported is CBC and CTR .
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FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operations (Hash Algorithm)

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  • Cryptographic hashing services conforming to ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.
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  • Hashing algorithms supported are: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.
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  • Message digest sizes supported are: 160, 256, 384, and 512 bits.
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FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)

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  • Keyed-hash message authentication conforming to ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm2”.
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  • Keyed hash algorithm supported are: HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA384, and HMAC-SHA-512
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  • Key sizes supported are: 160, 256, 384 and 512 bits.
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  • Message digest sizes supported are: 160, 256, 384, and 512 bits.
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FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)

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  • RSA digital signature algorithm conforming to FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3.
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  • RSA key sizes supported are: 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits.
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  • Elliptical curve digital signature algorithm conforming to FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing NIST curves ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4.
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  • Elliptical curve key sizes supported are 256 and 384 bits
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FCS_NTP_EXT.1 NTP Protocol

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  • The TOE supports NTP v3 and adheres to RFC 1305.
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  • Authentication is performed using SHA-1 as the message digest algorithm.
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FCS_RBG_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

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  • Random number generation conforming to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”
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  • The TOE leverages CTR_DRBG(AES)
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  • CTR_DRBG seeded with a minimum of 256 bits of entropy.
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FCS_SSHS_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol

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  • The TOE supports SSH v2 protocol compliant to the following RFCs:4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 5656, and 6668.
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  • The TOE supports password-based and public-key-based authentication.
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  • SSH public-key authentication uses ssh-rsa, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 and ecdsa-sha2-nistp384.
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  • SSH transport uses the following encryption algorithms: aes128-cbc, and aes256-cbc.
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  • Packets greater than 262155 bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
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  • SSH transport uses the following data integrity MAC algorithms: hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha2-512
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  • Key exchange algorithms supported are: ecdh-sha2-nistp256 and ecdh-sha2-nistp384.
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  • The TOE ensures that during SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour and no more than one gigabyte of transmitted data.
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FCS_SSHC_EXT.1 SSH Client Protocol

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  • The TOE supports SSH v2 protocol compliant to the following RFCs:4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 5656, and 6668.
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  • The TOE supports public-key-based authentication.
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  • SSH public-key authentication uses ssh-rsa, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 and ecdsa-sha2-nistp384.
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  • SSH transport uses the following encryption algorithms: aes128-cbc, aes 128-ctr, aes128-cbc and aes256-ctr.
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  • Packets greater than 262155 bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
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  • SSH transport uses the following data integrity MAC algorithms: hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha2-512
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  • Key exchange algorithms supported are: ecdh-sha2-nistp256 and ecdh-sha2-nistp384.
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  • The TOE ensures that during SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour and no more than one gigabyte of transmitted data
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1.1.1.3        Identification and Authentication

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All users must be authenticated by the TOE prior to carrying out any administrative actions. The TOE supports password-based and public-key based authentication. An administrator can set a minimum password length on the TOE which must be at least 15 characters. This is true of users accessing the TOE via the local console, or through protected paths using the remote CLI via SSH. Users can authenticate to the TOE using a username and password. In addition, when authenticating by the remote CLI, users can instead use SSH public-key authentication. Passwords can consist of upper-case letters, lower-case letters, numbers, and a set of selected special characters. Password information is never revealed during the authentication process including during login failures. Before a user authenticates the device, a customizable warning banner is configured to be displayed. 

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1.1.1.4        Security Management

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The TOE supports local and remote management of its security functions including:

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•             Local console CLI administration

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•             Remote CLI administration via SSHv2

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•             Configurable banner displayable at login

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•             Timeouts to terminate administrative sessions after a set period of inactivity

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•             Timed user lockout after multiple failed authentication attempts

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•             Configurable authentication failure parameters

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•             Re-enabling locked accounts

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•             Configurable cryptographic parameters

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The administrative user can perform all the above security-related management functions.

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1.1.1.5        Protection of the TSF

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The TOE protects all passwords, pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys from unauthorized disclosure. Passwords are stored as SHA 512 hashes. The TOE executes self-tests during initial start-up to ensure correct operation and enforcement of its security functions. The TOE internally maintains the date and time. An administrator can install software updates to the TOE after they are verified using a digital signature mechanism.

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1.1.1.6        TOE Access

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The TOE displays a customizable banner before any administrative session can be established with it. The TOE will terminate local or remote interactive sessions after a specified period of session inactivity configured by an administrator. An administrator can terminate their own interactive local or remote sessions.

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The local and remote CLI interfaces display the default security banner prior to authentication that is also configurable. The TOE can terminate local CLI and remote CLI sessions after a specified time-period of inactivity. Administrative users have the capability to terminate their own sessions.

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1.1.1.7        Trusted Path/Channels

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The TOE supports SSH for secure communications with authorized IT entities such as syslog servers. The TOE supports SSHv2 (remote CLI) for secure remote administration.

","features":[{"id":3255,"feature_name":"Asymmetric Key Generation"},{"id":3338,"feature_name":"Auditing"},{"id":3256,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Hashing"},{"id":3257,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Key Establishment"},{"id":3258,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Signature Verification"},{"id":3337,"feature_name":"Flaw Remediation"},{"id":3259,"feature_name":"Keyed-hash message authentication"},{"id":3253,"feature_name":"SSH Client"},{"id":3254,"feature_name":"SSH Server"}]}