The TOE comprises a dedicated hardware solution embedded into Galleon’s XSR and G1 products. The TOE (known as the Hardware Encryption Layer or as the Encryption Module) takes the form of either a physically separate card (within the XSR) or directly integrated into the mainboard (of the G1).
\r\nThe Encryption Module sits between the XSR and G1’s mSATA connectors and the mSATA drives themselves (which includes an RDM, internal SSDs, and the non-removable mSATA[only present in the XSR]), providing transparent hardware-based Full Disk Encryption (FDE) of those drives.
\r\nThe XSR and G1 products into which the TOE integrates can act in multiple different capacities (Network Attached Storage [NAS], data recorder, general server, etc.) and allow for encryption of the Removable Data Module (RDM) attached to the system. The Encryption Module within the XSR model supports encryption of one RDM (at a time), up to 4 internal SSDs, and its internal, non-removable mSATA SSD. Within the G1 model, the Encryption Module supports encryption of one RDM (at a time) and up to 2 internal SSDs. The Encryption Module securely encrypts all user data stored within.
\r\nIn addition to the hardware-based FDE layer, the XSR and G1 products also possess a software-based Full Drive Encryption (FDE) layer; however, this software-based FDE layer is addressed in a separate evaluation
","evaluation_configuration":"The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Galleon Embedded Computing Encryption Module (EM) running firmware version 4.1.0.
","security_evaluation_summary":"The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The evaluation demonstrated that the TOE meets the security requirements contained in the Security Target. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Galleon Encryption Module Usage Guidelines, Version 1.0.9, May 15, 2026 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Hardware Encryption Layer Security Target, Version 2.3, May 15, 2026. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in May 2026. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report (report number CCEVS-VR-VID11655-2026) prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"The logical boundaries of the Galleon Embedded Computing XSR and G1 Hardware Encryption Layer are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
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Cryptographic support:
\r\nThe TOE includes cryptographic functionality for key management, user authentication, and block-based encryption including: symmetric key generation, encryption/decryption, cryptographic hashing, keyed-hash message authentication, and password-based key derivation. These functions are supported with suitable random bit generation, key derivation, salt generation, initialization vector generation, secure key storage, and key destruction. These primitive cryptographic functions are used to encrypt Data-At-Rest (including the generation and protection of keys and key encryption keys) used by the TOE.
\r\nUser data protection:
\r\nThe TOE performs Full Drive Encryption on the entirety of each drive (so that no plaintext exists) and does so without user intervention.
\r\nSecurity management:
\r\nThe TOE provides each of the required management services necessary to manage the full drive encryption using a command line interface.
\r\nProtection of the TSF:
\r\nThe TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features. It protects key and key material, and includes functions to perform self-tests and software/firmware integrity checking so that it might detect when it is failing or may be corrupt. If any of the self-tests fail, the TOE will not go into an operational mode
","features":[{"id":4734,"feature_name":"Cryptograhic Hashing"},{"id":4735,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Signature Generation"},{"id":4736,"feature_name":"Cryptographic Signature Verification"},{"id":4737,"feature_name":"Encrypted Storage"},{"id":4738,"feature_name":"Full Drive Encryption"},{"id":4739,"feature_name":"Key Destruction"},{"id":4740,"feature_name":"Keyed-hash message authentication"},{"id":4741,"feature_name":"PBKDF"},{"id":4742,"feature_name":"Trusted Update Function"}]}