The Data Diode network interface card (NIC) is designed and manufactured by Owl Computing Technologies Incorporated. This Data Diode NIC was developed to support higher-level application software packages to provide secure one-way network communications. Owl markets and sells application programs that utilize the Data Diode Technology for specific data transfers. The difference in Version 1 and Version 2 of the TOE is strictly limited to throughput. The two versions are interoperable.
\r\nThe TOE is a pair of Data Diode NICs. Each card has two external interfaces. One external interface is the PCI Bus of the host in which the Data Diode NIC is installed. The other interface is the fiber optic network connection physically located on the card. Each Data Diode NIC has two network connections, one for incoming traffic, and one for outgoing traffic, however only one connection can be active for one type of card, therefore it requires a pair of Data Diode NIC cards to communicates from a sending host to a receiving host. If one host wishes to send and receive, it must install two Data Diode NICs on two different PCI slots.
\r\nThe purpose of the Data Diode NIC is one-way network operation at the physical interface between a network sender and receiver. Enabling only a single photodiode on the sender and a single light detector on the receiver insures one-way information flow over a fiber-optic line. The Data Diode NIC is provided in two models, the send-only and receive-only NICs.
\r\nThe information flow policy enforced by the Data Diode NIC does not rely on passwords, authentication, or encryption to protect host data. Rather the physics of a photo-detector and light emitting diode enforce the TSP.
","evaluation_configuration":null,"security_evaluation_summary":"The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process and scheme. The criteria against which the Owl Data Diode TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 and National and International Interpretations effective on May 10, 2002. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 1.0. Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) determined that the evaluation assurance level (EAL) for the product is EAL 2. The product, when configured as specified in the Secure DFTS Secure Directory File Transfer System OEM Install User's Manual (version N), satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Owl data Diode Security Target (Version 4.0). Three validators on behalf of the CCEVS Validation Body monitored the evaluation carried out by SAIC. The evaluation was completed in November 2002. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report, (report number CCEVS-VR-02-0026, dated 19 November 2002) prepared by CCEVS.
","environmental_strengths":"The Data Diode modifies a bi-directional Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) product into a unidirectional optical fiber connection between two networks. The physically modified Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) network interface cards and connecting optical fiber are termed the Data Diode TOE. Each of the ATM adapter network cards has been physically modified, and color-coded red and blue, such that the red card can only receive data, while the blue card can only send data. The Data Diode supports two security functions:
\r\nInformation Flow: A Data Diode NIC physically can only provide network traffic flow in one direction over any single network connection and this TSP is enforced at the physical level. One send-only Data Diode NIC communicating with a receive-only Data Diode NIC is required for communication between the physical machines where the cards reside.
\r\nTOE Self Protection: The Data Diode NIC protects itself by not exposing an interface that can modify the TOE. The only interfaces exposed are the PCI Bus interface and the network fiber optic interface. Neither interface can alter the TSF since the TOE has been physically modified to enforce the TSF and the TOE would have to be physically modified to violate the TSF. The TOE is assumed to be physically secure and it is also assumed that only trusted, non-hostile administrators are expected to ensure that the TOE is protected from physical attack.
\r\n","features":[]}