Archived U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Firewall Protection Profile for Medium Robustness Environments, V1.0, dated October 28, 2003
Short Name: pp_fw_mr2.0_v1.0
Technology Type: Firewall
CC Version: 2.x
Date: 09 January 2006
Succeeded By: pp_fw_mr_v1.1
Sunset Date: 21 March 2008
Conformance Claim: Medium Robustness
The U.S. Government Firewall Protection Profile for Medium Robustness Environments specifies the minimum-security requirements for network boundary devices that provide controlled connectivity between two or more network environments (hereafter referred to as the Target of Evaluation (TOE)) used by the Department of Defense (DoD) in Medium Robustness Environments. The TOE may be a dedicated device such as a firewall, or an enhancement to some other network device such as a router. The target robustness level of "medium" is specified in the Guidance and Policy for the Department of Defense Global Information Grid Information Assurance (GIG)  and is further discussed in Section 3.0 of this PP. The TOE supports user identification and authentication (I&A) where "user" is defined to be a human user acting in a role (i.e., Security Administrator, Cryptographic Administrator, and Audit Administrator) or an authorized IT entity. The TOE provides the capability to pass and block information flows based on a set of rules defined by the Security Administrator. Additionally, the TOE enforces security policies which restrict host-to-host connections to common Internet services such as: Telnet, File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). The TOE supports encryption for remote administration, remote users and authorized IT entities (e.g., certificate server, NTP server), and generates audit data of security relevant events. The assurance requirements were originally based upon Evaluated Assurance Level (EAL) 4. In order to gain the necessary level of assurance for medium robustness environments explicit requirements have been created for some families in the ADV class both to remove ambiguity in the existing ADV requirements as well as to provide greater assurance than that associated with EAL4. The assurance requirements are presented in Section 5.3. This PP defines:
- assumptions about the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used;
- threats that are to be addressed by the TOE;
- security objectives of the TOE and its environment;
- functional and assurance requirements to meet those security objectives; and
- rationale demonstrating how the requirements meet the security objectives, and how the security objectives address the threats.
SECURITY EVALUATION SUMMARY
The evaluation was performed under the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS). The purpose of the evaluation was to demonstrate that the U.S. Government Firewall Protection Profile for Medium Robustness Environments meets the APE security assurance requirements according to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 and Part 2 of the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 1.0. Validators on behalf of the CCEVS Validation Body monitored the evaluation carried out by COACT, Inc. CAFÉ Lab. The evaluation was completed on October 28, 2003. The results of the U.S. Government Firewall Protection Profile for Medium Robustness Environments evaluation can be found in U.S. Government Firewall Protection Profile for Medium Robustness Environments Validation Report prepared by the CCEVS Validation Team.
The evaluation was completed in October 2003. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Validation Report prepared by the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) CCEVS-VR-03-0049.
The evaluation of the U. S. Government Firewall Protection Profile for Medium Robustness Environments, Version 1.0 provides specification for environments in which TOEs with various levels of robustness are appropriate to meet Medium Robustness level of independently assured security requirements. The assurance requirements were chosen to be consistent with this goal.
Because a PP is written to be implementation-independent, there may be some ambiguities that do not arise until a specific implementation is being evaluated against it. When this happens, a resolution is established through the Observation Decision (OD) process in the form of a Precedent Decision (PD), which is to be used consistently in subsequent evaluations involving the PP in question. The Precedent Decisions specifically associated with this PP are listed below:
- PD-0105 of IKE Authentication as "Single Use" In Firewall PPs
- PD-0108 FTP_ITC.1.3 Specifies The Functions For Which A Trusted Channel Is Provided
This U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile is not assigned to any Validated Products
Please forward any questions or comments to firstname.lastname@example.org