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Compliant Product - Apple iPadOS 14: iPads

Certificate Date:  2021.09.01

Validation Report Number:  CCEVS-VR-VID11147-2021

Product Type:    Mobility

Conformance Claim:  Protection Profile Compliant

PP Identifier:    PP-Module for MDM Agent Version 1.0
  PP-Module for VPN Client Version 2.1
  Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals Version 3.1
  Extended Package for Wireless LAN Client Version 1.0

CC Testing Lab:  atsec information security corporation

CC Certificate [PDF] Security Target [PDF] Validation Report [PDF]

Assurance Activity [PDF]

Administrative Guide [PDF]

Product Description

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Apple iPadOS 14: iPads using the A9/A9X processor (iPad 9.7-inch (5th gen), iPad Pro 9.7-inch, iPad Pro 12.9-inch), A10 Fusion/A10X Fusion processor (iPad 9.7-inch (6th gen), iPad 10.2-inch (7th gen), iPad Pro 12.9-inch (2nd gen), iPad Pro 10.5-inch), A12 Bionic/A12X Bionic/A12Z Bionic processor (iPad mini (5th gen), 10.5-inch iPad Air (3rd gen), 11-inch iPad Pro, 12.9-inch iPad Pro (3rd gen), 11-inch iPad Pro (2nd gen), 12.9-inch iPad Pro (4th gen), and A14 Bionic processor (iPad Air (4th Gen)).

Evaluated Configuration

Devices Covered by the Evaluation


Device Name

Model Number


iPad 9.7-inch

(5th gen)




iPad Pro 9.7-inch




iPad Pro 12.9-inch



A10 Fusion

iPad 9.7-inch
(6th gen)



iPad 10.2-inch

(7th gen)




A10X Fusion

iPad Pro 12.9-inch (2nd gen)




iPad Pro




A12 Bionic

iPad mini 7.9-inch (5th gen)







iPad Air 10.5-inch (3rd gen)






iPad 10.2-inch

(8th gen)





A12X Bionic

iPad Pro 11-inch





iPad Pro 12.9-inch (3rd gen)





A12Z Bionic

iPad Pro 11-inch (2nd gen)





iPad Pro 12.9-inch (4th gen)





A14 Bionic

iPad Air (4th gen)





Security Evaluation Summary

The evaluation was carried out in accordance with the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) process. Evaluation was completed in September 2021. The criteria against which the Apple iPadOS 14: iPads was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 R5. The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation was the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, R5. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Apple iOS 14: iPhones and Apple iPadOS 14: iPads Common Criteria Configuration Guide, meets the requirements of the PP-Configuration for Mobile Device Fundamentals (MDF), Mobile Device Management (MDM) Agents, and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients Version 1.0 (which is comprised of  the Protection Profile for Mobile Device Fundamentals Version 3.1, the PP-Module for MDM Agents Version 1.0, and the PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Clients  Version 2.1); the General Purpose Operating Systems Protection Profile/ Mobile Device Fundamentals Protection Profile Extended Package (EP) Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Clients Version 1.0.

Apple iPadOS 14: iPads

The Apple iOS 14: iPhones and Apple iPadOS 14: iPads Common Criteria Configuration Guide document satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Apple iPadOS 14: iPads Security Target, version 1.5. The evaluation was subject to CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in July 2021. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report number CCEVS-VR-VID11147-2021, prepared by CCEVS.

Environmental Strengths

Cryptographic Support

The TOE provides cryptographic services for the encryption of data-at rest, for secure communication channels, and for use by applications. In addition, the TOE implements a number of cryptographic protocols that can be used to establish a trusted channel to other IT entities.

The TOE provides cryptographic services via the following cryptographic modules.

·       Apple corecrypto Module v11.0 [Apple silicon, User, Software] (User Space)

·       Apple corecrypto Module v11.0 [Apple silicon, Kernel, Software] (Kernel Space)

·       Apple corecrypto Module v11.0 [Apple silicon, Secure Key Store, Hardware]

Identification and Authentication

Except for making answering calls, emergency calls, accessing Medical ID information, using the cameras (unless their use is generally disallowed), using the flashlight, using the control center, and using the notification center, users need to authenticate using a passcode or a biometric (fingerprint or face). The user is required to use the passcode authentication mechanism under the following conditions.

·       Turn on or restart the device

·       Press the Home button or swipe up to unlock your device (configurable)

·       Update software

·       Erase the device

·       View or change passcode settings

·       Install iPadOS Configuration Profiles

The passcode can be configured for a minimum length, for dedicated passcode policies, and for a maximum lifetime. When entered, passcodes are obscured and the frequency of entering passcodes is limited as well as the number of consecutive failed attempts of entering the passcode.

The TOE also enters a locked state after a (configurable) time of user inactivity and the user is required to either enter his passcode or use biometric authentication (fingerprint or face) to unlock the TOE

External entities connecting to the TOE via a secure protocol (Extensible Authentication Protocol Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS), Transport Layer Security (TLS), IPsec) can be authenticated using X.509 certificates.

Security Management

The security functions listed in the Security Target can be managed either by the user or by an authorized administrator through a Mobile Device Management (MDM) system. The Security Target identifies the functions that can be managed and indicates if the management can be performed by the user, by the authorized administrator, or both.

TOE Security Functionality (TSF) Protection

Some of the functions the TOE implements to protect the TSF and TSF data are:

·       Protection of cryptographic keyskeys used for TOE internal key wrapping and for the protection of data-at-rest are not exportable. There are provisions for fast and secure wiping of key material.

·       Use of memory protection and processor states to separate apps and protect the TSF from unauthorized access to TSF resourcesin addition, each device includes a separate system called the SEP which is the only system that can use the Root Encryption Key (REK). The SEP is a separate CPU that executes a stand-alone operating system and has separate memory.

·       Digital signature protection of the TSF imageall updates to the TSF need to be digitally signed.

·       Software/firmware integrity self-test upon start-upthe TOE will not go operational when this test fails.

·       Digital signature verification for apps

·       Access to defined TSF data and TSF services only when the TOE is unlocked

TOE Access

The TSF provides functions to lock the TOE upon request and after an administrator-configurable time of inactivity.

Access to the TOE via a wireless network is controlled by user/administrator defined policy.

Trusted Path/Channels

The TOE supports the use of the following cryptographic protocols that define a trusted channel between itself and another trusted IT product:

·       IEEE 802.11-2012

·       IEEE 802.11ac-2013 (a.k.a. Wi-Fi 5)

·       IEEE 802.11ax (a.k.a. Wi-Fi 6)

·       IEEE 802.1X

·       EAP-TLS (1.0, 1.1, 1.2)

·       TLS (1.2)

·       IPsec

·       Bluetooth (4.0, 4.2, 5.0)

Security Audit

The TOE provides the ability for responses to be sent from the MDM Device Agent to the MDM Server. These responses are configurable by the organization using a scripting language given in the Over-the-Air Profile Delivery and Configuration document.

Vendor Information

Apple Inc.
Fiona Pattinson
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