Compliant Product - Cisco ASA with FirePOWER Services, ASA 9.8 and ASDM 7.8 with FirePOWER Services 6.2
Certificate Date: 2019.09.08CC Certificate Security Target Validation Report
Validation Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID10917-2019
Product Type: Firewall
Virtual Private Network
Conformance Claim: Protection Profile Compliant
PP Identifier: collaborative Protection Profile for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls Version 2.0 + Errata 20180314
Extended Package for Intrusion Prevention Systems Version 2.11
Extended Package for VPN Gateways Version 2.1
CC Testing Lab: Gossamer Security Solutions
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Cisco ASA with FirePOWER Services 6.2 with FireSIGHT (FMC) and FMCv 6.2.
The Cisco Adaptive Security Appliances with FirePOWER (FP) Services (FPS) is a purpose-built platform supporting firewall, VPN, and IPS capabilities. The ASA software running on the ASA hardware provides the firewall and VPN functionality, while the FirePOWER Services software (running concurrently with the ASA software on the same ASA hardware appliance) provides IPS functionality. The FMC appliances provide a centralized management console to configure IPS policies (enforced by FirePOWER Services), and an event database for storage and review of IPS events (generated by FirePOWER Services) and provides aggregation and correlation of intrusion, discovery, and connection data from the FirePOWER Services. In this deployment, the ASA provides VPN, firewall filtering, and passes traffic to the FirePOWER Services for discovery, intrusion detection, and IPS-related access control.
The evaluated configuration consists of the following hardware and software:
Security Evaluation Summary
The evaluation was carried out in accordance to the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS) requirements and guidance. The criteria against which the TOE was judged are described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017 . The evaluation methodology used by the evaluation team to conduct the evaluation is the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017. The product, when delivered and configured as identified in the Cisco Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) 9.8 Preparative Procedures & Operational User Guide for the Common Criteria Certified configuration, Version 1.1, July 23, 2019 and
Common Criteria Supplemental User Guide for FirePOWER Services v6.2 with FMC v6.2, Version 1.0, August 22, 2019 document, satisfies all of the security functional requirements stated in the Cisco ASA with FirePOWER Services 6.2 with FireSIGHT (FMC) and FMCv 6.2 (FWcPP20E/VPNGWcEP21/IPSEP211) Security Target, Version 1.0, August 22, 2019. The project underwent CCEVS Validator review. The evaluation was completed in August 2019. Results of the evaluation can be found in the Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Validation Report prepared by CCEVS.
The logical boundaries of the TOE are realized in the security functions that it implements. Each of these security functions is summarized below.
The TOE provides extensive auditing capabilities. The TOE can audit events related to cryptographic functionality, identification and authentication, and administrative actions. The TOE generates an audit record for each auditable event. The administrator configures auditable events, performs back-up operations, and manages audit data storage. The TOE provides the administrator with a circular audit trail or a configurable audit trail threshold to track the storage capacity of the audit trail. Audit logs are backed up over an encrypted channel to an external audit server.
The TOE allows authorized administrators to control which Sensor is managed by the FMC. This is performed through a registration process over TLS. The administrator can also de-register a Sensor if he or she wish to no longer manage it through the FMC.
The TOE provides cryptography in support of other TOE security functionality. The TOE provides cryptography in support of secure connections using IPsec and TLS, and remote administrative management via SSHv2 and TLS/HTTPS. The cryptographic random bit generators (RBGs) are seeded by an entropy noise source. Note IPsec is only supported on the ASA software, FirePOWER Services and FMC do not provide IPsec functionality.
User data protection:
The TOE ensures that all information flows from the TOE do not contain residual information from previous traffic. Packets are padded with zeros. Residual data is never transmitted from the TOE.
Identification and authentication:
The TOE performs two types of authentication: device-level authentication of the remote device (VPN peers) and user authentication for the authorized administrator of the TOE. Device-level authentication allows the TOE to establish a secure channel with a trusted peer. The secure channel is established only after each device authenticates the other. Device-level authentication is performed via IKE/IPsec X509v3 certificate-based authentication or pre-shared key methods.
The TOE provides authentication services for administrative users wishing to connect to the TOEs secure CLI and GUI administrator interfaces. The TOE requires authorized administrators to authenticate prior to being granted access to any of the management functionality. The TOE can be configured to require a minimum password length of 15 characters as well as mandatory password complexity rules. The TOE also implements a lockout mechanism if the number of configured unsuccessful threshold has been exceeded.
The TOE provides administrator authentication against a local user database. Password-based authentication can be performed on the serial console or SSH and HTTPS interfaces. The SSHv2 interface also supports authentication using SSH keys.
The TOE provides secure administrative services for management of general TOE configuration and the security functionality provided by the TOE. All TOE administration occurs either through a secure SSHv2 or TLS/HTTPS session, or via a local console connection. Management of all security functions can be performed via the FMC/FMCv component of the TOE, while a subset of management functions can be performed on the FirePOWER Services component. The TOE provides the ability to securely manage all TOE administrative users; all identification and authentication; all audit functionality of the TOE; all TOE cryptographic functionality; the timestamps maintained by the TOE; TOE configuration file storage and retrieval, and the information flow control policies enforced by the TOE including encryption/decryption of information flows for VPNs. The TOE supports an “authorized administrator” role, which equates to any account authenticated to an administrative interface (CLI or GUI, but not VPN), and possessing sufficient privileges to perform security-relevant administrative actions.
When an administrative session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator- configurable warning banner. This is used to provide any information deemed necessary by the administrator. After a configurable period of inactivity, administrative sessions will be terminated, requiring administrators to re-authenticate.
The TOE provides stateful traffic firewall functionality including IP address-based filtering (for IPv4 and IPv6) to address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of information, inappropriate access to services, misuse of services, disruption or denial of services, and network-based reconnaissance. Address filtering can be configured to restrict the flow of network traffic between protected networks and other attached networks based on source and/or destination IP addresses. Port filtering can be configured to restrict the flow of network traffic between protected networks and other attached networks based on the originating (source) and/or receiving (destination) port (service). Stateful packet inspection is used to aid in the performance of packet flow through the TOE and to ensure that only packets are only forwarded when they’re part of a properly established session. The TOE supports protocols that can spawn additional sessions in accordance with the protocol RFCs where a new connection will be implicitly permitted when properly initiated by an explicitly permitted session. The File Transfer Protocol is an example of such a protocol, where a data connection is created as needed in response to an explicitly allowed command connection. System monitoring functionality includes the ability to generate audit messages for any explicitly defined (permitted or denied) traffic flow. TOE administrators have the ability to configure permitted and denied traffic flows, including adjusting the sequence in which flow control rules will be applied, and to apply rules to any network interface of the TOE.
The TOE also provides packet filtering and secure IPsec tunneling. The tunnels can be established between two trusted VPN peers as well as between remote VPN clients and the TOE. More accurately, these tunnels are sets of security associations (SAs). The SAs define the protocols and algorithms to be applied to sensitive packets and specify the keying material to be used. SAs are unidirectional and are established per the ESP security protocol. An authorized administrator can define the traffic that needs to be protected via IPsec by configuring access lists (permit, deny, log) and applying these access lists to interfaces using crypto map set.
Intrusion Prevention System:
The TOE provides intrusion policies consisting of rules and configurations invoked by the access control policy. The intrusion policies are the last line of defense before the traffic is allowed to its destination. All traffic permitted by the access control policy is then inspected by the designated intrusion policy. Using intrusion rules and other preprocessor settings, these policies inspect traffic for security violations and, in inline deployments, can block or alter malicious traffic.
If the vendor-provided intrusion policies do not fully address the security needs of the organization, custom policies can improve the performance of the system in the environment and can provide a focused view of the malicious traffic and policy violations occurring on the network. By creating and tuning custom policies, the administrators can configure, at a very granular level, how the system processes and inspects the traffic on the network for intrusions.
Using Security Intelligence, the administrators can blacklist—deny traffic to and from—specific IP addresses, URLs, and DNS domain names, before the traffic is subjected to analysis by the access control rules. Optionally, the administrators can use a “monitor-only” setting for Security Intelligence filtering, which is useful to test applicability of custom blacklists (the “monitor-only” setting cannot be applied to the global blacklist, but custom blacklists can be created and set to “monitor-only,” which allows the TOE to pass the matching connection for IPS inspection, but also logs any match to the custom blacklist and generates an end-of-connection Security Intelligence event).
Protection of the TSF:
The TOE protects against interference and tampering by untrusted subjects by implementing identification, authentication, and access controls to limit configuration to authorized administrators. The TOE prevents reading of cryptographic keys and passwords.
Additionally, the TOE is not a general-purpose operating system and access to the TOE memory space is restricted to only TOE functions.
The TOE internally maintains the date and time. This date and time are used as the timestamp that is applied to audit records generated by the TOE. Administrators can update the TOE’s clock manually or can configure the ASA to use NTP to synchronize the ASA’s clock with an external time source. Additionally, the TOE performs testing to verify correct operation of the appliance itself and that of the cryptographic module. Whenever any system failures occur within the TOE the TOE will cease operation.
When an administrative session is initially established, the TOE displays an administrator- configurable warning banner. This is used to provide any information deemed necessary by the administrator. After a configurable period of inactivity, administrator and VPN client sessions will be terminated, requiring re-authentication. The TOE also supports direct connections from VPN clients and protects against threats related to those client connections. The TOE disconnects sessions that have been idle too long, and can be configured to deny sessions based on IP, time, and day, and to NAT external IPs of connecting VPN clients to internal network addresses.
The TOE supports establishing trusted paths between itself and remote administrators using SSHv2 for CLI access and TLS/HTTPS for GUI access. Each component of the TOE supports use of TLS for connections with remote syslog servers, and the ASA TOE component also supports use of IPsec to secure connections to remote syslog servers. The ASA TOE component can establish trusted paths of peer-to-peer VPN tunnels using IPsec, and VPN client tunnels using IPsec. Note that the VPN client is in the operational environment.
Cisco Systems, Inc.