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TD0134:  AES Data Encryption/Decryption in NDcPP MACsec EP v1.2

Publication Date
2016.12.21

Protection Profiles
PP_NDCPP_MACSEC_EP_V1.2

Other References
FCS_COP.1

Issue Description

FCS_COP.1(1) replaces the SFR from NDcPP. This SFR only allows the use of ASE KW and ASE GCM modes, so none of the trusted path SFRs can be implemented when restricted to these options. It appears that MACsec is the only trusted channel SFR that can be implemented with these algorithm restrictions.

Resolution

FCS_COP.1(1) will be updated to indicate a different iteration that focuses on the MACsec trusted channel SFR.  The original FCS_COP.1(1) will be inherited (with no change) from the NDcPP.

Remove section 4.2.1.2 “FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)” from the EP.

Add a section (4.2.2.11) “FCS_COP.1(5) Cryptographic Operation (MACsec AES Data Encryption/Decryption)”

FCS_COP.1.1(5) Refinement: The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in AES Key Wrap, GCM and cryptographic key sizes 128 bits, 256 bits that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, AES Key Wrap in CMAC mode as specified in NIST SP 800-38F, GCM as specified in ISO 19772.

 

Application Note: This EP mandates the use of GCM for MACsec and AES Key Wrap for key distribution so this SFR has been further refined from the NDcPP.

 

Application Note: AES-CMAC is a keyed hash function that is used as part of the key derivation function (KDF) that is used for key generation.

Assurance Activity

TSS

The evaluator shall verify that the TSS describes the supported AES modes that are required for this EP in addition to the ones already required by the NDcPP.

AGD

No additional guidance review activities are required.

Test

The evaluator shall perform testing for AES-GCM as required by the NDcPP.

In addition to the tests specified in the NDcPP for this SFR, the evaluator shall perform the following tests:

CMAC Generation Test

To test the generation capability of AES-CMAC, the evaluator shall provide to the TSF, for each key length-message length-CMAC length tuple (in bytes), a set of 8 arbitrary key-plaintext tuples that will result in the generation of a known MAC value when encrypted. The evaluator will then verify that the correct MAC was generated in each case.

CMAC Verification Test

To test the generation capability of AES-CMAC, the evaluator shall provide to the TSF, for each key length-message length-CMAC length tuple (in bytes), a set of 20 arbitrary key-MAC tuples that will result in the generation of known messages when verified. The evaluator will then verify that the correct message was generated in each case.

The following information should be used by the evaluator to determine the key length-message length-CMAC length tuples that should be tested:

-  Key length: values will include the following:

o 16

o 32

- Message length: values will include the following:

o 0 (optional)

o Largest value supported by the implementation (no greater than 65536)

o Two values divisible by 16

o Two values not divisible by 16

- CMAC length

o Smallest value supported by the implementation (no less than 1)

o 16

o Any supported CMAC length between the minimum and maximum values

Justification

To meet all SFRs, FCS_COP.1(1) from the NDcPP must be met.

 
 
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